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An argument that the Hillary Clinton campaign occasionally floats for reporters is that Hillary’s wins among the “big states” and among states that Democrats traditionally win make her the stronger candidate against John McCain in November. As the argument goes, Hillary has proven she can win California, New York, Michigan, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, all states that Democrats “must” carry in order to win the presidency. By contrast, Obama has won states in the south, Great Plains, and mountain regions of the country where Democrats haven’t won in recent years. Therefore, Obama will lose the election. Ed Rendell, governor of Pennsylvania and a Clinton supporter, made this argument on March 9, 2008 on Meet the Press with Tim Russert:

Tim, you and I have been doing this for a long time, as Tom has, and we know the big four in any presidential election recently are Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida and Michigan. […] She’s clearly the strongest candidate in the states that Democrats must win to have a chance. Look, it’s great that Barack Obama is doing wonderfully well in Wyoming and Utah and, and places like that, but there’s no chance we’re going to carry those states. Whether he gets 44 percent as opposed to 39 percent doesn’t matter, but we’re not going to carry those states. We do have a chance to carry the big four. We’ve got to in three of the big four. Hillary Clinton’s the strongest candidate to do that. That’s been proven by the voters in the–those states and hopefully by Pennsylvania as well.

But does this argument make sense? I’m going to explore four reasons why Democrats and other voters might want to treat this argument as suspect. It may be the case that Obama loses states in November which Clinton carried in the primaries, but the correlation looking at both historical data and current polling does not support this conclusion. In addition to the data I present, I argue that Democrats shouldn’t accept this argument, even were it true, for other political reasons.

The four problems:

1. Democrats cannot continue to ignore the rest of the country.
   Are all these states really necessary for Democrats, even assuming the premise is true? Also, what implication might voters not in “the chosen” states make with regards to this argument, and how might that affect the Democrats’ chances? If one of the two major candidate’s campaigns has just said that your state doesn’t “matter”, are you more or less likely to vote for that party at any level?
2. It’s not all about the presidency.
   Related to the above, it’s time that the campaigns remembered they aren’t the only ones running in November. Coat-tails are perhaps less important than they were a few generations ago, but the presidential candidates surely have to recognize that it’s to their advantage to help members from their party win election to Congress and state offices.
3. There is no definite correlation between losing a state in the primary and losing it in the general.
   Does a loss in the primary mean that the candidate can’t carry the state in the general election (or even suggest it’s likely)? I first addressed this issue in an article by Cliff Potter (that appears to be deleted). However, comparing primary and general election maps for the last several cycles fails to back this claim up.
4. Obama is winning or holding his own in the “true” Democratic strongholds: urban areas.
   Is it really true that Hillary is winning the Democratic strongholds? What are the Democratic stongholds? Are they states or are they really something else, like counties?

The rest of the country matters, too

…Or “Fly over me, will you? Let me get my SAM battery.”

One common criticism of Bill Clinton’s DNC in the ’90s is that he and Terry McAuliffe strangled the state parties, neglected states they had written off as “unwinnable”, and generally allowed Republicans free reign throughout the middle part of the country. To be fair, genuine demographic challenges partially informed this strategy, and the Democrats through most of the last several election cycles have been at a distinct disadvantage in fundraising. Unfortunately, the “triangulation” strategy of winning the coasts, the industrial midwest, and some combination of a small number of “swing” states was always a risky proposition. Bill Clinton won in ‘92 thanks to the fluke of a strong third party challenger and in ‘96 on the strengths of incumbency, a relatively quiescent global situation, and a good economy. In the face of riskier economic times, a more uncertain global political situation, and no incumbency, Democrats have faced poorly in presidential elections. While they haven’t faced blowouts like the elections of the ’80s, the brass ring has been held just out reach.

Thankfully, this is beginning to change. The DNC’s 50-state strategy, under the leadership of Howard Dean and a new generation of Democratic leaders, has re-energized state parties from Alaska to Texas and from Montana to North Carolina. Dividends were recognized in ‘06 by the sweep of Democrats into (narrow) majorities in both houses of Congress. Additionally, fundraising this cycle for both the House and Senate campaign committees is strong.

Democrats have a real shot at expanding their electoral map to states that haven’t been in play for a while. Colorado, Kansas, and Virginia are attractive targets this cycle. Colorado (9 electoral votes) and Virginia (13 electoral votes) would best a loss in Ohio (20 electoral votes). Thus, deficits from one or more of the “big four” that Rendell notes above could be more than offset by gains in other states. If the cards are played correctly, populations such as African and Latino Americans who normally undervote their demographics could turn out in big numbers and help make states like Texas, South Carolina, and Mississippi competitive. More on this later, but David Sirota notes there’s no particular reason to assume that the stalemate maps of the last two cycles are written in stone for the coming one:

The first assumption relates to the topography of the national electoral map. In talking about states that are “significant” and “insignificant” based on how they voted in previous elections, the Clinton campaign is assuming the basic map of the last 16 years automatically has to stay the same, and that there cannot be a map-changing candidate. This argument comes despite periodic elections in our history that have seen such shifts.

Regardless, it should be obvious that Democrats cannot continue to write off the middle of the country. If Democrats want to win the White House consistently, they have to learn to win more than 20 states. How many presidential elections are they willing to lose in order to learn this lesson?

We have a president, not a king

…Or “Everybody needs a little help sometimes.”

This may come as a surprise to some national correspondents and pundits, but the presidential race is not the only race that matters this cycle. Republicans would like to recapture one or both houses of Congress, and Democrats would love to increase their majorities. How nice it would be not to be beholden to Lieberman for a Senate majority come November!

Even beyond national politics, there are many down-ticket races that could hinge on who best turns out their voters. Texas Democrats have a shot at capturing one or more Texas Supreme Court seats for the first time in a decade, and with Texas likely to become one of the next sites for the creationism vs. evolution debate, those seats might matter in the national debate.

State legislatures could switch hands, and state legislatures are a traditional source for the next generation of party leaders. Again in Texas, Democrats have a real shot at taking the state house. Democrats would also love to hang on to recent gains at the state legislature level in other western and mountain states.

When a presidential candidate neglects “hopeless” states, he or she essentially creates a self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating prophecy (or a vicious cycle). Without national attention, the people in those states are more likely to feel in an adversarial relationship with the party in question. Without credible state party leaders, a party is not able to communicate its message as well to the state’s population. A healthy state party can be part of a virtuous cycle, sending competent leaders to compete at the national level and fundraising for national candidates and parties.

A president will rapidly find that his or her agenda is frustrated if he or she doesn’t have people in the Congress and in the states with which he can work to pass and carry out his or her legislations. A president seeking to enact national policies affecting health, security, and climate change will surely want to have lots of allies throughout the entire country, not just the few strongholds needed to gain an electoral college majority. So while it should be obvious, down-ticket races deserve the attention of the party and nominee.

Primaries elect nominees, not presidents

…Or “Primary problems don’t promise presidential privation.”

It’s somewhat difficult to analyze whether problems in primary elections results in problems in the general. One reason is that over the last several cycles, since primary reforms in the ’70s and ’80s, the normal course of events has been for one candidate to gain an early lead and then “sweep the board”. This rapid consolidation means that underlying problems that might have surfaced, don’t. However, a few cycles deserve mention.

In 2004, John Kerry lost the New Hampshire primary, but carried the state in the general election.

In 2000, George Bush famously lost NH to John McCain, but carried it in November.

In 1996, Bob Dole lost Alaska to Pat Buchanan, but carried it later.

In 1992, Bill Clinton lost Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, Maryland, Iowa and Colorado, all of which he ended up winning in November. In 1992, the last heavily contested Democratic primary which didn’t have an early sweep, we can see how many states a candidate can lose at the primary or caucus level and not lose to the other party in the general election. (You would think the Clintons would remember this lesson particularly well.)

Thus, it doesn’t seem to be correct that losing in the primary season means a loss in the general election.

Democratic “strongholds” are not rural counties

…Or “Who’s really winning the traditional Democratic areas?”

Perhaps the oddest component of the argument is that Clinton’s view of who is winning Democratic “strongholds” is contradicted (or at least made less clear) if one looks at the counties within each state. Democrats do well on the coasts, in the northeast, and in many of the major metropolitan areas. The county-by-county maps of 2000 and 2004 are remarkably similar to a broad degree.

If we accept Clinton’s argument, that the candidate will need to win Democratic areas in order to be competitive in November, why aren’t we actually looking at the areas themselves instead of state-wide (which has less predictive power)?

So who is winning in the areas which Gore and Kerry carried? A state like Missouri is instructive. It’s no secret that the way Democrats carry Missouri at the state-wide level is by winning big in St. Louis, its surrounding counties, Jefferson City, and Kansas City. This was the forumla for victory by Mel Carnanhan and Claire McCaskill, two recent winning senators from the state. It was also the main strategy of both Gore and Kerry, although both narrowly lost the state. It turns out that these are the very areas that Obama carried, allowing him to eke out a state-wide popular vote victory over Clinton. Why doesn’t it worry Clinton that she “can’t carry” the Democratic areas of a battleground like Missouri?

Similar to Missouri, Democrats have remained competitive in Ohio by winning the urban areas with large enough margins to offset losses in the rest of the state. And just like Missouri, Obama won in the biggest urban centers: Cincinnati, Columbus, Cleveland.

Another potential battleground to look at is New Jersey, but by now the theme should be familiar. Democrats need to do well in a band running through the center of the state, most importantly in Essex, Hudson, Mercer, and Camden counties. Obama did, in fact, win a band of counties through the center of the state and won two of the four “must win” counties (Essex and Mercer).

Much has been written about Obama’s loss in Massachusetts despite endorsements by the state’s leading Democratic party members. But no Democrat can win Massachusetts without Boston, and here Obama won as well.

Of major concern surely must be California, where Clinton carried the state. It’s no secret that California, however, is a virtual lock for the Democrats come November, but in the interest of humoring the premise, let’s look at those counties Democrats won in 2000 and 2004. In 2000, by my count, Al Gore won 21 counties, mostly along the Pacific coast. Kerry carried a similar number in 2004, again mostly concentrated at the coast. For the sake of argument, let’s look at those coastal and near-coastal counties (by my count 17: Humboldt, Mendocino, Sonoma, Lake, Napa, Yolo, Solano, Marin, Contra Costa, Alameda, San Mateo, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Monterrey, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles) that Democrats are likely to carry by big margins to secure a victory in the state. Obama won eight of these, so Clinton and Obama actually split the Democratic areas.

If it’s true that Democrats have a narrow chance in November in my state of Texas, then surely to do that the candidate will need to win the big cities by large margins: Austin, San Antonio, Dallas, Houston, Ft. Worth, and El Paso. Obama won four of these six.

Ultimately, this is a very strange argument. Clinton claims she’s in a better position to win in November because Obama wins in places like Utah and Wyoming. But (again, assuming the premise has merit) does a Democrat who loses in Boston and San Francisco, Austin and Philadelphia, Chicago and St. Louis really hold as strong a position as she claims?

Conclusion

It’s also worth noting that I’m not the only one to note problems with this argument. Writing for the Columbia Journalism Review, Zachary Roth notes another issue:

It’s hard to tell how the term “major battleground states” is being defined here. But the inclusion of solidly Democratic Illinois makes clear that-despite the final point about Ohio and Florida-we’re not talking about general-election swing states. It seems to mean “states with a large number of delegates at stake.” How many? Healy counts Minnesota and Wisconsin, both of which had eighty-eight delegates at stake, as “major battleground states.” So let’s say that, to qualify as a battleground, a state must have at least that many delegates. 

By that definition, the charge doesn’t begin to add up. So far, there have been fourteen contests that have offered eighty-eight or more delegates. Clinton has won six of these (California, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas). Obama has won eight (Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington, Maryland, Virginia, and Wisconsin.) Even if we throw in Michigan and Florida, where neither candidate campaigned (in Michigan, Obama wasn’t even on the ballot), Clinton has won no more “major battleground states” than has Obama.

Finally, recent state-by-state polling by SurveyUSA seems to suggest that Obama will do just fine, regardless of splitting primaries with Clinton. In a straight assignment to either Obama or McCain, based on polling results, Obama wins with a small margin. Pollster.com, analyzing these results further, concludes that Obama is no worse off than Clinton, and carries more upside advantage should he ultimately do well. (It’s worth noting that these polls were done before the recent controversy hitting the Obama campaign, and that such early polling is virtually meaningless as regards what the situation will be in November.)

The conclusion based on the balance of the historical and current evidence surely must be that the Clinton campaign argument is specious. At the very least, it hasn’t been convincingly demonstrated. Clinton might be the better candidate, but she needs a better argument to make the Democratic super-delegates for why she’s more electable than Barack Obama.

 

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Posted in Politics, Writing